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Current and Future Threats Framework in Smart Grid 
Domain 
 
Abstract—Due to smart grid’s complex nature and criticality 
as an infrastructure, it is important to understand the key actors 
on each domain in depth so the potential vulnerabilities that can 
rise are identified. Furthermore, the correct identification of 
threats affecting the smart grid’s normal functionality must be 
realised, as well as what impact these threats can have so 
appropriate countermeasures are implemented. In this paper a 
list of vulnerabilities that weaken the smart grid is outlined. Also   
structured analysis of attacks regarding the three key security 
objectives across the different layers is presented along with 
appropriate examples applicable to the smart grid infrastructure 
and what impact each of them has to the smart grid on each case. 
Finally, a set of new attack scenarios that focus on attacks being 
initiated from the smart home part of the smart grid is described 
targeting these security objectives with the potential 
consequences they can cause to the smart grid.  
Keywords—Smart Grid; Information Security; Vulnerabilities; 
Threats; Confidentiality;  Integrity; Availability; Attacks 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Smart Grid consists one of the most pioneering concepts of 
today transforming the well-known established traditional 
electric grid into a smart and efficient system of its own. Its 
main objectives is to ensure a two-way communication 
procedure between the customer and the services, improve the 
global warming situation and provide fast and integrate 
solutions in emergency situations. The different services 
provided are due to the deployment of information networking 
and the TCP/IP protocol. In contrast, due to the services used 
mentioned above, smart grid is in a constant and continuous 
communication with the Internet for the effective operation of 
its services. Due to it, the complexity in the system has been 
increased.  
    Hence, the smart grid a potential target for malicious 
activities, as it no longer consists of a disconnected set of 
entities that are isolated. In all systems in order to ensure 
security at least the three most important security principles 
must be satisfied, Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. 
The correct identification smart grid’s vulnerabilities and the 
types of security threats can lead to choosing the appropriate 
countermeasures. As a result, our motivation is the proper 
investigation and correct identification of the smart grid’s 
vulnerabilities and threats that can lead to the demonstration of 
new attack scenarios.  
II. SMART GRID SECURITY 
A. Smart Grid Architecture 
NIST established a conceptual model for the smart grid [1] 
consisting a total of seven conceptual domains in order to 
modularise its complex and heterogeneous nature, presented 
below. A representation of the smart grid is given in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Conceptual Overview of the Smart Grid [1] 
Bulk Generation is responsible for generating electricity. It 
consists of electrical equipment, remote terminal units, 
programmable logical controllers, equipment monitors and 
fault recorders. It also communicates with the market and the 
operation domains sending important information such as 
generation capacity and scarcity.  
Transmission domain is responsible for passing the amount 
of generated electricity sent from the bulk generation domain 
to distribution with the usage of a number of substations and 
transmission lines and self-healing when needed.  
Distribution communicates with the customer domain in 
order to deliver electricity to the end users according to 
demands and electricity availability. Also, distribution 
communicates with distributed energy resources, plug-in 
electrical vehicles and advanced metering infrastructures.  
Operation ensures the efficient and optimal operation of 
transmission and distribution domains. It uses the field and 
wide area networks located in both transmission and 
distribution domains to collect valuable information about the 
grid’s state using supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) systems.  
Market maintains the balance between the supply and the 
demand of electricity. This is operated by constantly and 
effectively communicating with the bulk generators and the 
distributed energy resources.  
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Customer is about who can consume, store and generate 
electricity. Home, commercial and industrial buildings fall 
into this domain. This domain communicates with the 
distribution, market, service provider and operation domains. 
With the introduction of the two-way communication in the 
smart grid, the customers can participate actively in the smart 
grid, using an entity installed in their premises called Energy 
Services Interfaces (ESI), and directly communicate with the 
utility centres and exchange information. Also, another entity 
installed, the smart meter (SM), can actively send metering 
data for billing purposes to the appropriate service providers 
for operating the data received. 
      Service Provider is responsible for offering electricity to 
the customers and the utilities. They operate functions such as 
billing and management of customer accounts. It receives the 
metering information by communicating with the operation 
domain and it provides smart services for the customer.  
B. Smart Grid Vulnerabilities 
Smart Grid is a state of the art set of interconnected systems 
which makes heavy usage of two-way communications and 
high speed exchange of information for the most efficient to 
the customers and environmentally-friendly usage of 
electricity. To achieve that, it uses a wide range of different 
types of equipment, each one with its own requirements, 
demands and operations, giving the infrastructure dynamic and 
interactive capabilities. However, the tradeoff in this situation 
is clear; in order to provide these remarkable services the smart 
grid has gained many and different vulnerabilities, each one 
with its own distinct characteristics. These vulnerabilities 
expose the smart grid to a plethora of threats that can damage 
the smart grid from a low to high degree. Below a set of high-
level vulnerabilities threatening the smart grid is presented as 
the authors in [2] have defined.  
Security of the Customers: Smart meter and Energy 
Services Interface (ESI) are responsible for collecting and 
transmitting massive amounts of data constantly and 
continuously. These data are considered to be private and 
confidential. 
Deployment of many intelligent devices: The usage of a 
great number of intelligent devices for the normal operation of 
the smart grid indicates their connection to the Internet making 
them an ideal case of attack entry points. 
Size of Smart Grid: It is estimated that smart grid is 100 to 
1000 times larger in size of the Internet. A size like this makes 
it management and network monitoring even more complex. 
Physical Security: The smart grid, in contrast to its 
predecessor, consists of many scattered components, outside of 
the utility centres, that are not monitored by staff making them 
physically reachable by anyone.  
Power Systems Lifetime: Power Systems in general consist 
of legacy systems that are probably outdated compared to the 
IT systems. For that reason, they might act as weak points in 
the system in general. 
Absolute trust between power devices: Machine to machine 
communications in the power systems are vulnerable against 
data spoofing in cases which the state of one machine directly 
affects the actions of another machine. 
No clear communication between the different teams: Due 
to different backgrounds of the teams involved, makes the 
communication between them inefficient and unorganized. As 
a result, bad decisions might be taken increasing the 
vulnerability. 
Usage of Internet Protocol: The usage of Internet Protocol 
makes the smart grid compatible with various components. 
Due to that though, all these devices using IP become 
vulnerable to attacks such as spoofing, teardrop, denial of 
service and so on. 
Increase in stakeholders: The large number of different 
stakeholders makes the system vulnerable to insider attacks. 
 The vulnerabilities identified above, illustrate the need for 
ensuring security in multiple levels in the smart grid network. 
Over the years, the need to protect the traditional IT networks 
has pushed the professional and industrial community to design 
and develop appropriate solutions for them. Since the smart 
grid has implemented various concepts from them, it would 
seem logical to use the solutions already defined as well. 
However, as the authors in [3,4] have accurately described that 
the smart grid network differs greatly from the IT networks. 
Specifically, they differ in their architecture, the technology 
used and their quality of service. The need for individual smart 
grid security solutions is essential.    
C. Smart Grid Security Objectives 
 As CISCO [5] and IEEE [6] have established, the three 
main security objectives are confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. Confidentiality involves the protection of personal 
information and ensuring the correct authorisation to disclosed 
information. Integrity involves the protection of information 
against unauthorised modification or even destruction. 
Availability involves the continuous and reliable access and 
usage of information and services.  
III. CURRENT ATTACKS AT THE SMART GRID 
In this section, a classification of the different attacks on 
different layers, consisting of all three objectives, is defined 
and a literature review of the already attack scenarios 
established with the consequences they can have.  
A. Attacks at the Physical Layer 
The most usual attack in the physical layer regarding 
availability is Jamming. To perform a jamming attack the 
attacker only needs to connect to a communication channel, 
which makes the launch of the attack easier. The authors in [7] 
have focused on Denial of Service (DoS) attacks from the 
remote terminal unit to the control centre. The attacker can 
jam the communication channels or attack the protocols or 
even just sent huge amounts of traffic to flood the network. 
This results into packets being lost and the control centre 
being unable to process the legitimate traffic it receives. 
Regarding confidentiality, eavesdropping can occur. It is a 
form of passive attack and as the name implies it involves of an 
adversary being able to overhear messages exchanged between 
two nodes over a communication channel. The authors in [8] 
discussed the attack scenario of an adversary eavesdropping 
data from Data Concentrator Nodes that forward the messages 
from the smart meters to the utilities, violating the customer’s 
privacy. Regarding integrity, the smart meter can be physically 
tampered from an adversary as the authors in [9] have stated. 
B. Attacks at the MAC Layer 
A passive-confidentiality attack is traffic analysis, in 
which adversaries is able to sniff/intercept and examine the 
messages in order to extract useful information about possible 
patterns of the communication between two nodes. 
Furthermore, an illegal modification of the MAC 
parameters, targets confidentiality again but in a more active 
way, masquerading, also called MAC/ARP Spoofing. This 
leads to the attacker having the freedom to launch more 
serious kinds of attacks such as the illegal modification of data 
before they are forwarded by using a Man-in-the-Middle 
attack (MITM). In [10], an adversary after performing ARP 
Spoofing succeeding into injecting false data or by using 
MITM attack succeeds into sniffing data. This can have severe 
consequences since the injection of false data can lead to 
disruption of the normal functioning of the network. 
Considering integrity, the data concentrator unit is directly 
connected to a home area network’s smart meter. A 
compromise of one can cause the blocking of information due 
to illegal modification of data [8] or a MITM attack between 
the data concentrator unit and the smart meter.  
C. Attacks at the Transport/Network Layer 
Attacks in these two layers, targeting availability, aim to 
disrupt the end-to-end communications by exhausting the 
resources, resulting into the destination device being unable to 
accept any legitimate traffic after a while. Some common 
examples are TCP and UDP Flooding Attacks. Regarding 
integrity, possible replay attack can occur, in which the 
adversary’s aim is to retransmit or delay messages; after 
obtaining them through a masquerading attack. Finally, for 
confidentiality, a possible MITM attack can occur as the 
adversary can perform IP-Spoofing to intercept malicious 
data.  According to the possible attack scenarios above, 
authors in [11], discussed about two attack-scenarios in 
SCADA networks. The first consisted of an attack on a 
SCADA substation from four different IP Spoofed Intelligent 
Electronic Devices. The attacker send compromised packets in 
order to gather information for the SCADA protocol used, 
DNP (although its is Layer-2 protocol). The modified packets’ 
aim is to corrupt the commands from a substation to an IED. 
The second consisted of an attack that aims to disrupt the 
control centre from again four IP spoofed substations in order 
to send random overload DNP packets so the control centre 
would be unable to respond fully to requests, as part of a 
replay attack.  
The authors in [12] have focused on attacks SCADA 
networks which use the IEC-104 Protocol. Specifically, they 
discussed about an attack scenario called ‘Spontaneous 
Message Storm’ consists of an enormous amount of data being 
sent from a server in either a control room operator or a 
control server in an attempt to flood them and reduce their 
availability to legitimate requests. 
Similarly, the authors in [13] have discussed about the 
possibility of a DoS TCP-SYN Flood attack, attack performed 
in substation IED devices that use the IEC-61850 protocol.  
The authors in  [14,15] have discussed of a distributed or 
simple DoS attack from smart meter/s to the data concentrator 
unit. The compromise of the meter can begin with 
compromising the device/s and proceeding to inject malicious 
traffic to the concentrator unit, resulting into its flooding and 
its unavailability to accept legitimate traffic. Such scenarios 
are not focused on stealing energy but disrupting the service of 
the area. The consequences of such cases can vary, from a 
‘simple’ service disruption to a major blackout, depending on 
the smart meters or data concentrators compromised. In case 
the adversary wants to trick the smart grid and pay less, the 
data is tampered during transmission to the utility, aiming for 
energy theft as the authors in [16] have discussed.   
Another attack that can be performed in the network layer, 
regarding availability and integrity, is the wormhole attack.  
The authors in [17] have also focused on cyber attacks 
between the smart meter data transmission to the data 
concentrator unit and from the utility centre to the data 
concentrator unit. Specifically, they have discussed about the 
possibility of a wormhole attack at this part of the smart grid. 
A compromised meter can drop all or most of the packets it 
receives from the concentrator node to achieve the attack 
resulting into the smart grid becoming unstable.   
Also, in the transport layer buffer overwhelming can be 
performed threatening the smart grid’s availability. The authors 
in [12] have also stated an attack scenario called ‘Potential 
Buffer Overflow’ in which the attacker generates and sends 
packets whose length is bigger of normal packets so the 
destination’s buffers can be filled faster and become 
unresponsive in SCADA systems using the IEC-104 Protocol.  
D. Attacks at the Application Layer 
 Application layer attack’s main aim is to exhaust the 
target’s CPU and memory by flooding it with intensive periods 
of requests in application level. Also, selective message 
forwarding can be a threat in the application layer; the 
adversaries succeed in including themselves in a data 
communication channel and dropping certain packets, thus 
preventing them from reaching their destination. Sometimes, 
instead of selective packets the adversary might drop packets 
from certain sources or follow a random pattern. The authors in 
[18] have discussed about cyber attacks in industrial control 
systems. In particular, they discuss a DoS scenario in 
application level. It is called ‘Invalid Cyclic Redundancy Code 
(CRC)’ and aims to send large in number of MODBUS (serial 
communication protocol to transmit data between two 
electronic devices) packets with a faulty CRC. The target 
device is forced to check every packet’s CRC so in our case the 
target device is flooded or even crashed so the communication 
is majorly disrupted and unable to accept any legitimate traffic. 
The authors in [19] have simulated a selective forwarding 
attack where multiple meters were compromised, resulting into 
a number of packets being dropped while other being 
forwarded normally. 
TABLE I.  ATTACKS ACROSS DIFFERENT LAYERS 
OSI Layer Type of Attack 
Physical Layer Jamming, Eavesdropping, Meter Tampering 
MAC Layer MAC DoS, Traffic Analysis, MAC/ARP Spoofing, 
Jamming 
Transport/Network 
Layer 
Buffer Flooding, TCP/UDP Flooding, Replay Attack, IP-
Spoofing, Data Injection, Wormhole 
Application Layer HTTP Flooding, Protocol Attacks, Selective Message 
Forwarding 
Multiple Layers MITM 
IV. FUTURE ATTACKS AT THE SMART GRID 
As it has been highlighted from the previous section, the 
two main parts of the smart grid the research is focused on 
securing the AMI and the entities located in the distribution 
and transmission domains. However, little focus has been put 
into the ‘last mile’, the home area network. The majority of 
research targets into threats in HAN where the smart meter is 
the main target of the attack. Mainly its compromise aims to 
disrupt the normal activity of the HAN, or in some cases to 
attack the data concentrator unit. As a result, HAN tends to be 
treated as an isolated network. However, that is clearly not the 
case. The HAN is also connected to the smart grid and an 
attack can be initiated from it. Hence, various smart grid 
services can be damaged more that can be estimated. 
Moreover, even the studies that have focused on this aspect of 
attacks have just stayed up to the Headend and have not gone 
deep into the different services and the possible consequences 
of their potential malicious disruption. 
HAN and its technologies are evolved rapidly every day. 
An important change that must be considered is that the 
customer gateway is no longer integrated with the smart meter 
device, instead it consists of a separate entity, called the ESI. 
A number of activities that used to be operated through the 
smart meters are not longer executed by it now.  That means 
that the attacker is free to compromise more than one device, 
depending on what their aim is. Specifically, as authors in [20-
22] have outlined smart meter now is only responsible for 
mainly the energy consumption data forward and reporting 
outage issues whereas the ESI is responsible for interacting 
with the HAN devices, communicating with the external 
service providers as well as handling any load shedding and 
demand/response signals and acting accordingly to the 
situation.  
Additionally, the smart appliances used in the network 
become more and more ‘intelligent’. Even if they don’t consist 
of a usual graphical user interface they indeed use application 
layer protocols to communicate, such as the Constrained 
Application Protocol (CoAP) [23] thus being vulnerable to 
Application Layer attacks, including HTTP Flooding as well 
as the less common Low-Rate attack (LDoS).  
Hence, it is clear that general flow of information and 
functionality of the various entities involved needs to be 
reviewed and reassessed so the potential vulnerabilities and 
threats can be realised. A set of possible attack scenarios have 
been identified and presented below regarding Availability 
and Integrity. Although confidentiality attacks, initiated from 
the smart home entity, they cannot directly harm the smart 
grid they can indirectly prepare the ground for major attacks. 
As it is shown in the following attack scenarios every attack is 
initiated with an impersonation of a key-entity inside the smart 
home. This consists of an attack targeting confidentiality. 
Below a set of detailed attack scenarios is outlined as well as a 
summary of them in Table II. 
TABLE II.  FUTURE THREATS IN SMART GRID 
Source Dest./data sent Attack Type Consequence Security  
Goal  
ESI DRMS/LMS (DR 
ack.) 
HTTP 
Flooding/LDo
S  
DRMS/LMS 
dysfunction 
Availability 
ESI ESP (DR ack) HTTP 
Flooding/LDo
S  
Dysfunction 
ESP servers 
Availability 
ESI DRMS/LMS (DR 
ack) 
Replay Attack/ 
Injection 
Overload grid  Integrity 
ESI ESP (DR ack) Replay Attack/ 
Injection 
Overload grid Integrity 
ESI DRMS/LMS 
(Load 
Shedding/Load 
Control Signals) 
HTTP 
Flood/LDoS  
DRMS/LMS 
dysfunction 
Availability 
ESI DRMS/LMS 
(Load 
Shedding/Load 
Control Signals) 
Replay Attack/ 
Injection 
Overload grid  Integrity 
ESI Third Party 
Gas/Water 
Utilities (leak 
report) 
HTTP Flood/ 
LDoS 
Dysfunction 
utility  
Availabil
ity 
ESI Third Party 
Gas/Water 
Utilities (leak 
report) 
Replay Attack Wasted time in 
false 
notifications 
Integrity 
  SM OMS (outage 
report) 
HTTP 
Flood/LDoS 
DRMS/LMS 
dysfunction 
Availability 
  SM OMS (outage 
report) 
Replay Attack Wasted time in 
false signals 
Integrity 
  SM OMS (DER 
shutdown) 
HTTP 
Flood/LDoS 
DRMS/LMS 
dysfunction 
Availability 
 SM OMS (DER 
shutdown) 
Replay Attack Wasted time in 
false signals 
Integrity 
ESI  OMS (traffic lights 
power outage) 
HTTP 
Flood/LDoS 
Dysfunction of 
the OMS 
Availability 
ESI  OMS (traffic lights 
power outage) 
Replay Attack Wasted time in 
false signals 
Integrity 
ESI DRMS/LMS (DR 
ack for DER) 
HTTP 
Flood/LDoS 
DRMS/LMS 
dysfunction 
Availability 
ESI DRMS/LMS (DR 
ack for DER) 
Data Injection Overloading 
the grid  
Integrity 
 
1) ESI to Demand Response Management System/ Load 
Management System (DRMS/LMS) or Energy Service 
Providers (ESP) (DR Singals)  
The DRMS/LMS services send demand/response (DR) 
signals to the customers either via the AMI Network or via 
external networks (e.g. Internet) either to help the customers 
manage their energy consumption in a more efficient way. The 
signals can consist of the price, urgency or level. In response, 
the ESI sends an acknowledgement of the DR signal. In a 
possible attack scenario (via the AMI network), the 
compromise of the ESI and the possible capture of old 
acknowledgment packets can be used to flood the 
DRMS/LMS services aiming to disrupt their functionality, 
thus violating the availability objective. In case of the signal 
being transmitted through external networks, it is the ESP, 
which sends the signals, and the acknowledgment response 
will be sent from the ESI back to it. The attack scenario 
follows the same procedure as explained above, and its aim is 
to disrupt the normal functioning of the ESP, again threatening 
the availability objective.  Another scenario, again initiated by 
the impersonation of the ESI, is followed by either a replay 
attack or a data modification attack, both of them violating the 
integrity objective. The compromised ESI either replaces the 
signals received with older, or deletes/modifies them. This can 
have sever consequences in cases which the smart grid is 
highly loaded but the altered signals trick the appliances into 
functioning continuously draining the smart grid even more. 
2) ESI to DRMS/LMS (Direct Load Control/Direct Load 
Shedding)  
Direct Load Control and Direct Load Shedding use the 
same technologies. In the former, the DRMS/LMS send 
signals to start/stop the operation of smart appliances 
depending on the state of the grid and the appliances’ state, so 
the customers can pre-cool their plenums during the morning 
and cycle off their air conditioning at peak times. In the latter, 
in case of an emergency, the facilities are shut down in order 
for the smart grid to be protected and not to collapse. In both 
cases, DRMS/LMS send a load control signal, for load 
shedding it also sends a “scram command”, and the ESI 
responds back with an acknowledgement. ESI can be 
compromised and capture old acknowledgment packets can be 
used to flood the DRMS/LMS services aiming to disrupt their 
functionality and thus, putting the state of the smart grid into a 
critical condition, the availability objective being violated. 
Also, instead of flooding the services, the impersonation of the 
ESI can replay old messages or modify the signals contents 
and thus tricking the appliances into not functioning according 
to the smart grid’s commands resulting into threatening its 
stability, violating the integrity objective.  
3) ESI to Third Party Utility (gas/water utility)  
In case of a possible leakage of either a gas or water meter 
the ESI is responsible for notifying the appropriate utility to 
ensure the safety of the customer by sending a leak 
notification. However, in a possible attack scenario, a 
compromised ESI can flood the utility with fake messages of a 
leak and making the utility unavailable to legitimate leak 
notifications from other ESIs, violating the availability 
objective. In a slightly different scenario, the compromised 
ESI sends old and outdated leak notification messages, as part 
of a replay attack, violating the integrity objective.     
4) SM to Outage Management System (OMS) (power 
outage reports) 
In case of power flow interruption; the smart meter is 
responsible for sending a power outage report to the Outage 
Management System to notify them about the issue so it can 
be fixed. However, an adversary can masquerade themselves 
in the smart meter and by capturing older messages, and even 
altering the messages, attempt to flood the OMS and 
overwhelming it, violating the availability objective. As a 
result, the OMS might become unavailable to legitimate 
reports being sent to it of real power outage.  In a similar 
scenario, the adversary’s goal is not to flood the OMS but 
rather send old power outage reports, as part of a replay attack. 
The impact is not severe, the utility wastes time in responding 
to fake outage requests, violating the integrity objective. 
5) SM to OMS (DER-shut down signals) 
In cases of an outage in the grid, the DER has to shutdown 
or island itself. However, the islanding/shutdown equipment 
can be either poorly installed or maintained. For that reason, 
the meter can detect whether the islanding operated correctly 
or not. If not, then the meter communicates with the OMS 
requesting its shutdown. A possible attack under this scenario 
is that the compromised meter will flood the OMS with DER 
shutdown messages threatening its stable functionality, 
violating the availability objective. In a slightly different 
scenario, after a compromise of the meter and a possible 
replay attack, the shutdown of DER occurs without really 
needing to, violating the integrity objective.  
6) ESI to OMS (traffic lights power outage reports) 
With the new technology integrated in the NAN part of the 
Smart Grid it is now possible to detect the outage of any 
streetlights in an area. In a possible attack scenario a 
compromised ESI can flood the OMS with fake outage reports 
of streetlights and disrupt its normal functioning and reduce its 
availability to legitimate incoming outage reports. Also, in the 
context of a replay attack old messages could be retransmitted, 
targeting integrity. Again, the impact is not severe but the 
utility wastes time into responding to fake outage requests. 
7) SM to Meter Data Management System (MDMS)  
A possible scenario is when the smart meter sends the 
energy consumption data acquired from the smart home to the 
MDMS (via the AMI Headend) so it can forward them for 
billing the customer. A possible compromise of the smart 
meter along with the capture of old metering messages can be 
used to flood the MDMS and disrupt its communication with 
the billing entity, violating the availability objective. In cases 
that the aiming of the adversary is to ‘steal energy’ they can 
modify the packets to pay less. A more sophisticated attack 
would involve the adversary into masquerading appliances 
that consume a large amount of energy as other appliances that 
consume less energy aiming for a cheaper bill, violating the 
integrity objective. 
8) ESI to Demand Response Management System/ Load 
Management System (DRMS/LMS) (DR Signals for the DER 
Resources)  
The smart grid has the option to manage energy using 
customers’ Distributed Energy Resources (DER). The 
DRMS/LMS server sends Demand/Response signals either 
through the AMI Headend or directly to the ESI so it can act 
depending on the message, containing information about the 
urgency and level of import/export, received to forward it to 
the DER resources. In exchange, the ESI sends an 
acknowledgement of receiving the message. Again, in a 
possible attack scenario, the adversary after taking control of 
the ESI can send multiple acknowledgements back to the 
DRMS/LMS server, thus putting the grid intro critical state 
primarily from the attack itself and, but also in cases when the 
grid needs legitimate extra energy resources to support it from 
collapsing, violating the availability objective. Also, instead of 
causing flood attacks, the compromised ESI can drop the 
signals or illegally modify them so no the desired functioning 
by the DER resources is performed, violating the integrity 
objective. 
V. WHAT’S NEXT 
The threats described in section III, have managed to be 
detected successfully by a number of IDSs proposed. On the 
other hand, the threats, described in Section IV, are yet to be 
addressed in any way. Furthermore, the new emerging 
technologies and components used in HAN have made the 
bottom layer of the Smart Grid an entity that needs to be 
equally secured. The attack scenarios clearly illustrate the 
criticality of this entity the high likelihood of a possible attack 
affecting the Smart Grid being initiated from the Smart Home 
part. These two entities need to be considered as a whole and 
not as separate.  One of the most effective security solutions in 
mitigating such types of threats is the usage of Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS). As a result, a potential IDS solution 
could be developed to detect these new threats. This IDS shall 
follow a distributed approach, due to the system’s broadness 
and complexity, so the network can be effectively monitored. 
A vast amount of audit data shall be collected, focusing on the 
application layer, to detect any kind of potential unauthorised 
activity as soon as possible before it is spread to the higher 
layers of the network. In that way, the protection of such a 
critical infrastructure can be increased.         
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we outlined the three most important security 
objectives and how they are applied in the smart grid context. 
The potential vulnerabilities in the technologies integrated in 
the smart grid were identified, highlighting the smart grid being 
vulnerable as any other network infrastructure and high 
importance must be given on its proper security. Due to the 
grid’s individual characteristics tailored solutions must be 
designed especially for its own needs. Hence, we also outlined 
on what that can be performed on various parts of this complex 
critical infrastructure from the research community in the form 
of scenarios and what consequences such attacks can bring. 
Due to the continuous improvement and change of smart grid 
technologies and the customer’s active involvement, new 
security threats can rise. As a result, the need for more research 
on possible threats and attacks being initiated from the smart 
home and resulting affecting the smart grid has been 
highlighted. To support our views a set of new attack scenarios 
have been outlined illustrating the process in performing such 
attacks and the possible consequences their action brings to the 
smart grid’s state. In future, it is essential that research shall 
focus on such new technologies as accurate and efficient 
security solutions will be designed and implemented to protect 
the smart grid.  
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